Are we Miklós Horthy's soldiers?

Photos on site at venue: Tamás Thaler
Franz Ferdinánd, before his assassination in June, in the vicinity of Sarajevo conduction inspection of the troops

Brest-Litovsk and Versailles versus Trianon and Rapallo: are we Miklós Horthy's soldiers? *[1]

The project director began the meeting held by Aspektus on November 15, 2019, at the Kossuth Club in Budapest by saying that the deadline for the short clip competition had been extended by popular demand.

Géza Gecse said also that the reason for giving such a long title to the closing event was that in part because the contemporaries taking part in the negotiations referred to the continuity of the international agreement of March the 3rd in Brest-Litovsk and that of April the 16th, 1922 in Rapallo at least in a certain analogy, and also in part, it shows the failure in conduct which both parties, i.e. Soviet Russia and Germany, demonstrated by the end of the war when Europe was then the cultural and economic center of the world. The territory ceded from Russia, the first defeated nation of World War I, in Brest-Litovsk was at approximately 1 million square kilometers as large in a territory as Germany herself.hmk_brest-litovsk.jpg Kamenev heading the Soviet delegation arrives at Brest-Litovsk

From a military standpoint, Germany was completely disarmed at Versailles. While her neighbors Poland had 600 000 soldiers in arms and France in peacetime 700 000, Germany's number was not allowed more, than 100 000.
The peace-dictate signed at Saint-Germain with Austria, also 100 years ago, was in terms of a territorial standpoint even worse than that of Trianon for Hungary, as it ceded three-fourths of the country. From an ethnic standpoint, such homogeneous German territories came under Italian and in particular Czechoslovak jurisdiction, which had no business being there. It would have been quite easy to work out a solution in which they could have remained in Austria or annexed to Germany.  A total mockery was made thus of the right to national sovereignty, in the name of which the entire conference took place on the outskirts of Paris in January 1919, in that not only was Austria not allowed to unite with Germany, but neither was the name of Germany-Austria permitted. Austria was allowed essentially the same, moreover even smaller force than Hungary, a skeleton of an armed force of merely 30 000 soldiers and although given the circumstances this was not a serious threat, even the possibility of a union with Hungary was forbidden. For Germany, the Peace Treaty signed one hundred years ago on June the 28th in Versailles was not nearly as severe in terms of territory, but in economic terms, the Versailles Treaty imposed a far greater burden than the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the exact scope of the reparations imposed by it were not able to be agreed upon for years.

Below is a link to that part of the event in which we summarize all that which the closure of the First World War meant with the invited speakers, in Hungarian, but the content of which is summed up in this article (in English):


Miklós Horthy on the Great Hungarian plain in 1923

The third important date which may not be overlooked is the centenary of Hungarian Admiral Miklós Horthy's marching in Budapest. Why didn't the Horthy regime make a state memorial day of November the 16th, as there is film footage of him ceremoniously entering Budapest then?
Gábor Ujváry, director of the VERITAS Institute stated that although there are no written documents or otherwise proof, it is clear that Admiral Horthy entering Budapest on November the 16th was strategic. The politics of symbolism spans across the era. The negotiations at Versailles began on January 18, 1919, the same day on which the formation of the German Empire was declared in 1871. The Peace Treaty was signed with the Germans in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles on June the 28th, exactly five years after Gavrilo Princip's gunshots sounded in Sarajevo, – Gábor Ujváry told the audience.

Beginning from December of 1918, the Károlyi and then the Berinkey governments declared consistently all movements against them to be counterrevolutionary and therefore Horthy's political advisors chose this day to enter the Hungarian capital, on purpose to distinguish the Horthy regime if not from the republic state form, but at least from the form instated by the Károlyi government.
László Gulyás, professor of history at the University of Szeged informed the gathering there is a conference of historians on the Horthy era every year in Szeged and there will be one in this year, too. There are three possible dates from which one can date the beginning of the Horthy regime. The first is August 13, 1919, when Miklós Horthy flies from Szeged to Siófok and becomes an independent political factor in setting up headquarters there. The second is the entrance into Budapest on November 16, 1919. The third, referred to as the technically legal date, is March 1, 1920, when Horthy was voted Regent. Certainly, a factor in the regime not making November the 16th a day of national observance was that the left took to the streets at the same time and therefore they would have been commemorating the declaration of the republic one year earlier. And let us not forget that for Horthy, Franz Joseph, who avoided symbolic political demonstrations, remained a role model. In addition, the White Terror cast a shadow on November the 16th. When meeting with either British representatives or the conservatives everyone asked whether or not there would be a White Terror or Jewish pogrom when Horthy enters Budapest. It was for this reason that Horthy signed a promissory note before British diplomat George Russell Clerk stating that there would not be such a problem.
Zoltán Tefner, professor of history at the Corvinus University stated that it should not be forgotten that in August of 1919 the majority of Hungarian society saw the promise of consolidation in Miklós Horthy and for that reason, the support base of the later Regent was far broader than today we generally think of it being. He had an army and a few thousand detachments, former officers who accompanied him from Szeged and with whom he had by that time occupied a part of Transdanubia. A few of the operations carried out by Prónay and Héjjas, however, triggered negative international reactions. But there were not only armed soldiers behind Horthy in August of 1919 but also those figures whom we consider „Miklós Horthy soldiers”, who were not in the military. Moreover, until then, these people had never considered getting involved in politics.
                 Ottokár Prohászka

Zoltán Tefner here highlighted the person of Ottokár Prohászka, born in Érsekújvár (today Nové Zámky in Slovakia, at that time an integral part of the Hungarian kingdom)   and whose family was Catholic and ethnically German and Moravian. Prohászka was raised in Rome, in the Germanico-Hungarico Institute: he studied six years there until he became a priest. It was encoded in his genes to keep clear of politics. He did not even possess the self-confidence for a political role but yet in 1906, he came to the conclusion that only Christian Socialism could save Hungary from total destruction. From then on he began to consider who could be that person who would be capable of realizing a program to socially uplift Hungary and he found that person in 1919, in the person of Horthy and joined his “non-military troops”. Few are aware of the fact that on the 1st of March in 1919 when Horthy was voted Regent by the national assembly it was Prohászka who went to pick up him by car from the Gellért Hotel and with his direction lead the delegation to the House of Parliament for Horthy to be chosen as head of the Hungarian state. Later the Regent had wanted to offer Prohászka the post of the prime minister, but that was a post the bishop would not accept. As a spokesman for the national assembly Prohászka made incredibly sweeping speeches for nearly a month until he came to loathe doing this. He did not detect the same sort of strength in the national assembly that he saw in Horthy himself. November 16th therefore held the message also that not only those could be „Miklós Horthy's soldiers” who had been in the armed forces, but also those while not actively, but as silent partners, supported the new regime.

Géza Gecse noted that it has been 101 years when it seemed all was lost, the Habsburg Monarchy’s and Germany's troops were in enemy territory everywhere on the eastern front. Gyula Gömbös in spite of this suggested that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy take command of the territories occupied by Germany on the eastern front, too.
As Gusztáv Gratz who developed the economic chapter on the part of the Habsburg Monarchy for the peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk wrote in his book following the war: by the end of August 1918, it was clear to them that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would not be able to continue to hold its own economically past January 1919.
                Gusztáv Gratz

And beside Ukraine, one of the key territories of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty was Poland during the course of the war, because by the autumn of 1916 it became clear that it would be an independent nation. This is key for us, as Hungarians, because without an independent Poland there would have never been an independent Czechoslovakia nor an independent Yugoslavia.
Zoltán Tefner said that the Habsburg Monarchy had succeeded in alienating the Poles even before the Brest-Litovsk treaty was signed when they invited the (and note the wording) Ukrainian People's Republic to the negotiation table. Although by 1917 Hungary had not sunk to a serious provisions and supplies crisis, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on the whole had. Charles IV and his foreign minister Ottokar Czernin had to secure wheat from somewhere. Therefore due to its catastrophic economic state, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy concluded a peace with the Ukrainians on February 9, 1918, named the “Peace for Bread” (Brotfrieden).

                 Peace for Bread with Ukraine, February 9, 1918
In exchange, Ukraine was awarded the territories east of Lublin in the vicinity of Chelm.  This prompted such persons to abandon the Habsburg Monarchy whose loyalty to the dynasty until had been unquestionable.

                   Józef Haller

The Polish general Józef Haller, for example, escaped via Murmansk to Paris and from then on fought against the Central powers on the side of the Entente. This slight remained up until the start of the war with the Bolsheviks. In the summer of 1920, Hungary provided the Poles with weapons made by the Weiss Manfréd factory – one can read of huge numbers here – and that the Red Army was unable to occupy Warsaw was to Miklós Horthy's credit as well. This fact was most likely influential in the Poles signing immediately the treaty with the Germans at Versailles, however, they were not as quick to sign the Peace Treaty of Trianon, signed with the Hungarians.

        June 4, 1920. The Hungarian delegation on route to the Grand Trianon Palace

The situation changed of course when the war with the Bolsheviks came to an end but at this time in the region, Hungarians were the only people the Poles could count on.
Géza Gecse noted that two royal coups took place in 1921, one in March, the other in the autumn of the same year. The detachments, who were then playing an active role, were half Habsburg loyalists whilst the other half supported an independent Hungarian kingdom free of any Habsburg relationship or influence. There was no difference, however, between these two factions concerning whether or not the town in West of Hungary: Sopron and its surroundings should remain part of Hungary and in fact, primarily as a result of their activity, this territory is to this day part of Hungary.
                         Pál Prónay

Just to mention a few names: Pál Prónay, Iván Héjjas, Gyula Ostenburg-Moravek, and Mihály Francia Kiss.

In the following year, in 1922 even the two largest European nations to be defeated in the war, Germany and Soviet Russia were invited to Genova the purpose of which was to negotiate the economic reconstruction of Europe and who, while in the small town of Rapallo near Genova agreed on a zero option agreement amongst themselves and assumed diplomatic relations.
          Miklós Bánffy

The newly appointed Hungarian foreign secretary, Miklós Bánffy was not idle either. On several occasions he met with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Georgy Chicherin to negotiate on initiating Hungarian-Soviet diplomatic relations, although, as he noted, there is no need for a peace treaty between the two countries because that was already concluded at Brest-Litovsk in 1918. Then the French, who were not satisfied with the construction of German reparations, in the following year, in 1923 marched into the Ruhr region. Interestingly, that in spite of the fact that they remained stationed there fully armed, and notwithstanding the fact that the Germans did not resist militarily, they got nowhere. A few months later they were forced to evacuate the territory.
                     The German and the Soviet delegations at Rapallo

According to Gábor Ujváry, Rapallo in part resulted from Brest-Litovsk. Russia was not invited to the peace negotiations at Versailles because she had made a separate peace at Brest-Litovsk. Géza Gecse noted that one should consider the failed negotiations at the Prince's Islands (presently part of the administrative territory of Istanbul), suggested by U.S. president Woodrow Wilson. What’s more, an emigré Russian government was formed in Paris in 1918 just as with the Poles and the Czechoslovaks but there were also other reasons for the Russians not being present at the peace negotiations in 1919, such as the fact that various White Russian counterrevolutionary political forces loathed each other more than they did the Bolsheviks.

The main point is that Bolshevik Russia's relations with European nations were unfavorable due to its global revolutionary program for upheaval. Gábor Ujváry noted that the Germans were able to more easily achieve agreements with the Russians because the economic relations between the two nations were not nearly as great on the scale as with other nations, such as France. The Russians had been by then decimated and crisis in the Germany of 1923 was total, where tens of thousands starved to death, which had not occurred there for ages. In addition, there were internal conflicts with the Kapp and Hitler coups. Chaos reigned. The 1923 military entrance by the French ended in total defeat, Gábor Ujváry emphasized, as it was enough for the German government to order the German miners and public officers not to work, in exchange for which they would still receive their salaries. The result was that the French were not able to procure provisions and had to maintain the armed forces from their own resources.

László Gulyás felt that the issue is not who won or lost at Versailles, or who was the cause of the problems but rather that the victorious nations were unable to work out a sensible peace treaty.

In 1815 the powers of Europe had been able to resolve a series of 20-year wars that had been waged for 100 years. Comparatively, the Versailles peace resolutions made permanent a mass of conflicts that carried within them the possibility of war. Wilson envisioned a utopian new world with the League of Nations, which proved to be nothing but a facade by 1922.

Zoltán Tefner quoted Henry Kissinger in his capacity as a former American National Security adviser as saying that he saw the roots of the problem lies in the fact that the politicians of the early 20 century were not of the same caliber as those of the previous century. They were far less talented and in general weak in character. Wilson, for instance, was easily offended, which is unacceptable for a politician.

Gábor Ujváry added that the greatest winner in the war still turned out to be the United States of America, not only economically and politically, but culturally as well, as it was able to urge the defeated nations to copy America and this was the point when Germany began to be Americanized. America's exit from the European continent was executed on purpose.

László Gulyás added that America assumed its role not only as a power on the European stage but also as a global power that Roosevelt made clear to the participants of the London Conference of 1932.

Concerning Rapallo, Zoltán Tefner stated that when polish Chief of State Józef Pilsudski learned of the agreement between the Germans and the Soviets he had a conniption fit. This could be considered a sort of precursor to the Ribbentrop Molotov pact, as at the time the commander in chief of the German armed forces considered a joint German-Soviet military action with Russia, the result of which would have included the annihilation of Poland, in spite of the fact that both the Soviet Union and Germany were completely exhausted.

At the same time there was the false myth of the Polish-Hungarian friendship, noted László Gulyás –, because while Hungary had vested interest in the complete destruction of the Versailles treaties, Poland became the beneficiary of that same framework. If it hadn't been for the Seven Day's war of January 1919, during the course of which Beneš succeeded in procuring part of Teschen, it would not have been unimaginable for Poland to have been incorporated into the Little Entente.

Let us add that it is even more interesting that after Turkey succeeded in compelling the revision of the 1920 Sevres Peace Treaty, (which meant that at least she retained at least the ethnically Turkish territories) and after the Lausanne Treaty was signed in 1923-ban, Kemal Ataturk's political leadership became stronger adherents of the new world order Géza Gecse noted.

The Rapallo Treaty was signed by two countries on the brink of economic bankruptcy, Gábor Ujváry interjected, and he added that among Hungary's neighbors all were hostile except for Austria, whose neutrality was not, however, benign. Only in 1927, following winning the political support of Italy, was there a tiny opening for revisionist politics. The Revision League in Hungary was formed at this time as well.

Moreover, Miklós Kozma, the director of Hungarian Radio, thought that the appearance of revisionist propaganda over the radio would endanger the ethnic Hungarians now living as minorities outside Hungary's borders, so this propaganda was totally absent from the Hungarian broadcast Géza Gecse noted, which is why Kozma was so popular with one of the central propagandists of the Kádár regime, Ernő Lakatos.

Three decades on from the political transition the debate around the person of Miklós Horthy has yet to be settled. There are those who do not consider him a positive figure not only at the beginning but even during the World War II, including the re-annexation of territories, in which, with the exception of Subcarpathia, territories with majority Hungarian populations were rejoined to Hungary thereby rectifying much of the injustice of the Treaty of Trianon. As a result in 1941 Hungary had a population of 82% ethnic Hungarians while Hungarians still remained in Southern Transylvania and in Slovakia as well. What Horthy can be criticized for is the year of 1944, when a major proportion of the Jewish population was transported to concentration camps where they died, said Géza Gecse, although there is no proof of the Regent's responsibility in that.
hmk_img_20191115_181457.jpgThe phenomenon of “Horthy phobia” is evident not only among researchers in Hungary but also among those outside of Hungary as well, noted László Gulyás. Catherine Horel in France, for instance, is unable to point to a single positive act by Horthy throughout his entire life and she casts doubt even on his accomplishments during World War I. László Gulyás believes that there are various phases of Horthy's career, the end of which is undoubtedly that of the beginning of March 19, 1944, which is followed by the Holocaust but he referred to Gábor Ujváry as being able to expound on this topic with more authority than he, as he has studied in detail Bálint Hóman's life which is judged in a similar vein.

Yes, but Hóman was not the head of state, Gábor Ujváry continued, and he went on to say that March the 19th, 1944, similarly to the Soviet Republic of Hungary, was one of the lowest points in 20th century Hungarian history. Miklós Horthy's decision not to resign, as the deposed prime minister Miklós Kállay had advised him to do, legitimized all that which was to follow. If Horthy had resigned then he would have been gone down in history as one of the great Hungarian statesmen.

But if he had resigned following March 19 he would not have been able to give the command to colonel Ferenc Koszorús in July 1944, the result of which was that the Jewry of Budapest escaped the deportations, interjected Géza Gecse.

We don't know what might have happened in that case, but it is not inconceivable that not only the deportation of the Jewish population of Budapest but also that of the countryside might not have taken place, i. e. that the deportation of Hungary’s jews would not have taken place at all. Consequently, Gábor Ujváry stated that is why István Bethlen, Kunó Klebelsberg and with a bit of effort  Pál Teleki can be counted amongst the great Hungarian statesmen from this era, but Horthy - not.

This was followed by a question and answer session.

László Wolczyk was curious as to what would have happened if Hungary had refused to sign the Treaty of Trianon, and when had there been a window of opportunity in which the national boundaries outlined in that treaty might have been changed.
According to Gábor Ujváry in November-December of 1918, there was a possibility for some sort of revision, but none following that point.

Although Mihály Károlyi was an inept politician there was sense in a weapons transfer as there were areas then in Hungary in really terrible condition. Károlyi was not a traitor – it was he who ordered the “No-No-Never!” (revisionist) posters from Ernő Jeges, which appeared on the streets by the end of December in 1918.

                                        No!No! Never!

Géza Gecse noted that Transylvania had been occupied by 20, 000 Romanian soldiers in December 1919, while the Romanian army was being continuously developed. Just to compare: in August 1916 the Romanian Army broke into Transylvania with 300, 000 soldiers!

Professor Gulyás stated that there are two marked opinions concerning the Hungarian soldiers returning home in late 1918. The one that they would have been suitable for defending Hungary, the other is that they would not have been. It would be worth seriously examining this question nor is it irrelevant which territory we examine as in certain instances there is national ethnic political significance, from a Hungarian standpoint, as to whether or not there was an attempt to bludgeon a given (ethnic Hungarian) notary to death and whether or that attempt was successful.

Gábor Ujváry called to attention the fact that half of the units returning from the front were from different nationalities and therefore it is questionable as to whether or not they could be counted on to defend the Hungarian position.

Concerning the regular and irregular soldiers, László Gulyás noted that it is difficult to judge. What would one call the Ragged Guard for example? Pál Prónay was a non-commissioned officer serving in the Guard. It is also questionable whether he created the Lajtabánság by his own authority or whether there was cooperation with the Hungarian government in this, or perhaps he was simply slightly mad.

Zoltán Tefner stated that soldiers were spontaneously returning from the front. It was somewhat strange that there were professional elements in recruiting for the Hungarian Red Army to which Gábor Ujváry noted that in fact these recruits had been forced to join the army. The central government was in charge of the allocation of resources and the government directors stated that if the trade union members do not join the Red Army then not only they, but also their families would starve to death.

As a result of a visit to the conference in Szeged on the interwar period in Hungary on November 25, 2019, we extended the deadline for short films until December 4, 2019.

In all 20 jury participants (historians: Zoltán Tefner (Corvinus University), Géza Jeszenszky (former Minister of Foreign Affairs), Ferenc Pollmann (Museum of Military History), László Gulyás (University of Szeged),  István Majoros (Professor Emeritus at ELTE University), Andor Bánsági (WW1 blogger), Dávid Ligeti (VERITAS Institute) Géza Gecse (Aspektus) and Péter Hevő (ELTE); cameramen: Nándor Kelecsényi (National Filmmaker’s Association) and János Liszi graphic; teachers: Balázs Lados, András Mészáros, János Csordás, and Éva Hutvágnerné Róth; organizers for the Aspektus team: Juliet Szabó and Zsolt Bánhegyi, former winners of our previous clip-competitions: Ágoston Sándor and Dávid Varga students; vice-president of Rákóczi Association: Balázs Tárnok) judged the entries for the clip competition and based on their ratings of the total submissions, 5 short clips were ranked in the first, second and third places in the following order.

The prizes were given to the winners also in the Kossuth Club on  December 6, 2019.

First place went to the video entitled From Fehérgyarmat to Hiroshima/ Fehérgyarmattól – Hirosímáig/ the starting point of which is the introduction and description of a World War I memorial in the town of Fehérgyarmat in the county of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg which was then followed by wartime newsreels depicting events on the war front. Simultaneously the film notes the fact that the war was fought on two fronts. Tanks and airplanes appear on-screen invoking the revolution in the machinery of the war. The film informs the viewer that one of the ancestors of the creator of the film, István Farkas, fought on the eastern front, and for that, he had been awarded a rank in the Vitéz Order (a Hungarian order of merit which was founded in 1920) which a fact which the filmmaker's own grandfather relates in the clip. The short film notes that one of the consequences of World War I was Hitler coming to power in Germany and thus that the Second World War was brought about from the First which the filmmaker demonstrates with a shot of the dropping of the bomb at Hiroshima.

Filmmaker: Sándor Molnár, a student at the faculty of Arts and Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University.
To view the film, click on the link below:

Second place was awarded to the short clip entitled Enthusiasm for the First World War/ Lelkesedés az első világháborúban/. In this clip, the filmmaker added her own piano playing as background music. She elaborates on the various forms of enthusiasm showed for the war at its outbreak, mainly in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, during the month following the assassination of Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo, and this is compared to that of Germany. The filmmaker employed a series of primarily postcards, maps, and other primarily still images to illustrate her film and she did the narration describing not only the content of the 1914 propaganda but also how it shifted.

Filmmaker: Ágnes Vida, a student at the faculty of Arts and Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University.

To view the film, click on the link below:

Because there was only a slight difference in the points awarded for three clips following the first and second placing, the competition's organizers decided to award 3 third-place prizes to the following 3 short films.

Amongst these, the piece submitted by the students of the secondary school in the town of Paks was somewhat of a surprise to the members of the jury. Entitled Students of the Secondary School at Paks on the decision of the Second Vienna Award of August 30, 1940/ A paksi gimnázium diákjai az 1940. augusztus 30-i II.bécsi döntésről és fogadtatásáról/. This short clip invoked the day of the Second Vienna Award of August 30, 1940, in which, due to the ruling by Italy and Germany, Northern Transylvania was returned to Hungary. Using contemporary music and photos of Paks the short film referred to the events of 1940 and, primarily with a few short dialogues, invoked the events of the Belvedere Palace in Vienna and how they were received by the Hungarian public and in particular Paks. At the end of the dialogue, the screen shows the area returned to Hungary. (It is important to note that this was the most important territorial revision between 1938 and 1941 designed to correct the injustice of the Peace Treaty of Trianon.) The members of the jury noted that a major flaw of this submission was that it did not indicate anywhere the connection between the First World War and the Treaty of Trianon, how the peace-dictate resulted if it all, from the First World War.

To view the film, click on the link below:

Filmmaker: students of the Paks Secondary School. The award was received by Bátor Bagócsi. 

dij_1941_d3b.jpgAlso placing third was the film produced by the Secondary School from Kecskemét entitled „Victim, Aid, Heroism/ Áldozat, segítség, hősiesség/” which uses as its starting point the state of the town around the time of the World War I. Also using primarily still images postcards, paintings, newspaper articles, and photos show the town at the time. From these is highlighted the Russian attack on Felső-Komárnok, which had previously been part of Hungary but now in the territory of present-day Slovakia, and during which most of the small town, which was at the time populated primarily by Rusyns, was destroyed. During the war, the town of Kecskemét played a major role in reconstructing Felső-Komárnok, something which the Rusyn small town has commemorated on a memorial plaque and which the town's inhabitants remember to this day. The film also mentions the fact that residents of Kecskemét visit the town.

Filmmaker: students of the Secondary School in Kecskemét.

József Károlyfalvi, the history teacher and consultant for the group, received the prize.
To view the film, click on the link below:


The jury also awarded third prize to the video entitled „Let us remember the heroes!/ Emlékezzünk a hősökre!/”. The filmmaker here used archive footing from World War I, then shows a few photos of World War I Hungarian memorials noting that the erecting of First World War memorials began in Hungary since 1917. This was ended with a long shot of the First World War memorial in Lovasberény, in Fejér county, and then it describes with photos and other documents, how many residents of the small town took part in the war, how many perished or became war prisoners of war, the general theme of the film being how greatly the war affected the life of a small community for generations to come.

Filmmaker: Anett Dózsa, a student at the faculty of Arts and Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University.

To view the film, click on the link below:




[1]     This in reference to a popular song of the day „Horthy Miklós katonája vagyok” („I am one of Miklós Horthy's soldiers”, a song of support for the Regent).